档案
INPO12-012 2012年12月
INPO
Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture
健全的核安全文化特征
OPEN DISTRIBUTION 公开发行
OPEN DISTRIBUTION: Copyright 2012 by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Not for sale or commercial use. All other rights reserved.
公开发行：版权2012 美国核电运行研究所。非卖品。版权所有。
NOTICE: This information was prepared in connection with work sponsored by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Neither INPO, INPO members, INPO participants, nor any person acting on behalf of them (a) makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this document, or that the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document may not infringe on privately owned rights, or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document.
注：该信息是由美国核电运行研究所发起准备的。无论是INPO组织，INPO成员，INPO的代表，或者任何人，（a）不对该文件的准确性，完整性或有效性做任何承诺。使用该文件中的信息，仪器，方法或过程不得侵犯私人权利。(b)因使用这些信息，仪器，方法或者过程，承担责任。
TABLE OF CONTENTS/目录
INTRODUCTION/介绍................................................................................................................................ 4 BACKGROUND/背景……………………………………………………………………………………...6 THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES/特征及其特点.................................................................... 11 Individual Commitment to Safety/个人对安全的承诺...............................................................................11
Personal Accountability/个人职责...........................................................................................................11 Questioning Attitude/质疑的态度............................................................................................................11
Safety Communication/安全沟通............................................................................................................12 Management Commitment to Safety/管理者对安全的承诺.......................................................................14
Leadership Accountability/领导职责.......................................................................................................14 Decision-Making/决策.............................................................................................................................15 Respectful Work Environment/彼此尊重的工作环境..............................................................................16 Management Systems/管理体系..................................................................................................................17
Continuous Learning/持续学习...............................................................................................................17 Problem Identification and Resolution/识别问题、解决问题..................................................................17 Environment for Raising Concerns/关注的氛围................................. ....................................................18 Work Processes/工作流程.......................................................................................................................19 Acknowledgements/致谢.............................................................................................................................21
INTRODUCTION
Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture builds on the knowledge and experience developed since the publication of Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture in 2004. The change in the title reflects the commercial nuclear industry’s alignment of its own terminology with that used
介 绍
《健全的核安全文化特征》是基于2004年出版的核安全文化原则的知识和经验而产生的。标题的变化，体现了核工业的商业化与美国核管理委
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This 员会的一致。此文件由美国核行业人document was developed through a collaborative effort by 员和美国核电运行研究所（INPO）成《健全的核安全文化U.S. industry personnel and the staff of the Institute of 员共同努力而成。
Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), with input from 特征》整合了两套用于描述核安全文representatives of various regulatory agencies, the public, 化的术语：美国核电运行研究所
and the nuclear industry worldwide. Traits of a Healthy
（INPO）和核能产业以领导者的身份
Nuclear Safety Culture reflects an alignment in two sets of
定义了安全文化的主要原则和特征，
terms that have been used to describe nuclear safety culture:
而美国核管理委员会定义了安全文化
INPO and the industry defined safety culture in leadership
terms of principles and attributes, and the U.S. Nuclear 的组成。每一套术语都有其特定的功Regulatory Commission defined safety culture in regulatory 能，但两套术语同时使用容易在运营terms of components and aspects. Whereas each set of terms 组织中引起混淆，这是一个健全的安served its special function, the result created confusion 全文化应当避免的。 within operating organizations as to the essential elements of a healthy safety culture.
Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the
《健全的核安全文化特征》描述
essential traits and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety 了一个健全的核安全文化的特征和他culture, with the goal of creating a framework for open
特点，目的在于在整个商用核电工业
discussion and continuing evolution of safety culture
领域中建立一个自由交流，持续改进
throughout the commercial nuclear energy industry. For the
安全文化的框架。根据该文件的目的，
purposes of this document, a trait is defined as a pattern of
将特征定义为一种思维方式、感观、
thinking, feeling, and behaving such that safety is
emphasized over competing priorities. Experience has 行为，认为安全重于一切。经验表明，shown that the personal and organizational traits described 该文件中描述的个人和组织的特征反in this document are present in a positive safety culture and 映在一个积极的安全文化中。缺少这that shortfalls in these traits and attributes contribute 些特征，将对电厂事故产生重要影响。 significantly to plant events.
Rather than prescribing a specific program or 该文件描述的是基本特征，而不
implementation method, this document describes the basic 是特殊程序或者实施办法。一个组织traits. These traits and attributes, when embraced, will be
及其成员的价值观、理念、行为、信
reflected in the values, assumptions, behaviors, beliefs, and
念、规范将体现这些特征和特点。理
norms of an organization and its members. Ideally, the traits
想地讲，这里所述的特征描述的是在
will describe what it is like to work at a nuclear facility and
一个核电环境中，做什么工作及怎样
how things are done there. Traits appear in boldface. The
工作。 特征以黑体字出现。特点阐明attributes clarify the intent of the traits.
特征的含义。
Utility managers are encouraged to make in-depth
绩效经理应在该特征与其它日常
comparisons between these traits and their day-to-day 准则之间做深入对比，并以此为基础，
policies and practices and to use any differences as a basis
持续改进。
for improvements.
In addition to the traits and attributes, two addendums are
除了这些特征和特点，还有两个
available. Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support 附件可供参考。 附件1：《支持健全核a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, describes executive,
安全文化的行为》，描述了总经理，高
senior manager, manager, supervisor, and individual
级经理，监查人员以及个人对核安全
contributor behaviors that contribute to a healthy safety
文化作用行为。另附有表格，描述了
culture. An additional table is provided to describe detailed
每一个特征的具体行为和行动。附件
behaviors and actions for each attribute. Addendum II:
《交叉引用》，包括从INPO12-012，Cross-References, provides cross-references from INPO 2：
、以及之前12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, to the 《健全的核安全文化特征》
previous Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, U.S. 的《核安全文化准则》、美国核管理委Nuclear
reactor 员会相关文件、及国际原子能机构安
assessment program cross-cutting area components, and the
全文化特征中的引用。 这些交叉引用
International Atomic Energy Agency safety culture
可以帮助员工理解这些通俗易懂的语
attributes. This cross-reference can help individuals
言是如何发展而来，以及怎样在这一
understand how the common language was developed and
can be useful in change management efforts in this 重要领域改变管理方式。 important area.
Regulatory Commission operating
Rather than prescribing a specific program or 该文件描述的是基本特征，而不implementation method, this document describes the basic 是特殊程序或者实施办法。一个组织traits. These traits and attributes, when embraced, will be 及其成员的价值观、理念、行为、信reflected in the values, assumptions, behaviors, beliefs, and 念、规范将体现这些特征和特点。理norms of an organization and its members. Ideally, the traits 想地讲，这里所述的特征描述的是在will describe what it is like to work at a nuclear facility and
一个核电环境中，做什么工作及怎样how things are done there. Traits appear in boldface. The
工作。 特征以黑体字出现。特点阐明attributes clarify the intent of the traits.
特征的含义。
Utility managers are encouraged to make in-depth 绩效经理应在该特征与其它日常comparisons between these traits and their day-to-day 准则之间做深入对比，并以此为基础，policies and practices and to use any differences as a basis 持续改进。 for improvements.
In addition to the traits and attributes, two addendums are 除了这些特征和特点，还有两个available. Addendum I: Behaviors and Actions That Support 附件可供参考。 附件1：《支持健全核a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, describes executive, 安全文化的行为》，描述了总经理，高senior manager, manager, supervisor, and individual 级经理，监查人员以及个人对核安全contributor behaviors that contribute to a healthy safety 文化作用行为。另附有表格，描述了culture. An additional table is provided to describe detailed
每一个特征的具体行为和行动。附件behaviors and actions for each attribute. Addendum II:
《交叉引用》，包括从INPO12-012，Cross-References, provides cross-references from INPO 2：
、以及之前12-012, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, to the 《健全的核安全文化特征》
previous Principles of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture, U.S. 的《核安全文化准则》、美国核管理委Nuclear reactor 员会相关文件、及国际原子能机构安assessment program cross-cutting area components, and the 全文化特征中的引用。 这些交叉引用International Atomic Energy Agency safety culture 可以帮助员工理解这些通俗易懂的语attributes. This cross-reference can help individuals 言是如何发展而来，以及怎样在这一understand how the common language was developed and can be useful in change management efforts in this 重要领域改变管理方式。 important area.
Regulatory Commission operating
BACKGROUND
Watershed events over the years have influenced the safety culture at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. The industry had its first significant wake-up call in 1979 as a result of the accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station. Many fundamental problems involving hardware, 背 景 过去几年，一些转折性事故影响了美国商用核电站的核文化。第一次警示是发生在1979年的三里岛核电站事故。这次事故涉及许多基础性问题，procedures, training, and attitudes toward safety and 如硬件、程序、培训、安全态度以及
监管。 regulation contributed to the event.
In 1986, the Chernobyl accident was a stark reminder of the 1986年，切诺贝利事故是对核技hazards of nuclear technology. This accident resulted from 术危害的另一个重要提醒。这次事故many of the same weaknesses that led to the Three Mile 由许多与三里岛事故相同的原因造Island accident. In addition, it highlighted the importance of 成。此外，它强调了设计结构，核电maintaining design configuration, plant status control, line 站运行控制，核反应堆安全业务权限，authority for reactor safety, and cultural attributes related to
以及安全文化特点的重要性。 safety.
Response from industry and regulatory organizations to both 核工业领域以及监管组织对这两these events was sweeping. Improvements were made in 次事故的反应是彻底的。对安全的改standards, hardware, emergency procedures, processes, 进体现在许多方面，如标准、硬件、training (including simulators), emergency preparedness, 应急措施、程序、培训（包括模拟的）、design and configuration control, testing, human 应急预案、设计与结构控制、测试、performance, and attitudes toward safety.
人员绩效、安全态度等。
The 2002 discovery of degradation of the Davis-Besse 2002年发现戴维斯-贝斯核电站Nuclear Power Station reactor vessel head highlighted 反应堆压力容器封头老化，这表明，problems that develop when the safety environment at a 如果不重视安全环境，便可能出现问plant receives insufficient attention.
Most recently, the 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima 题。 最近的一次事故，2011年日本福Daiichi power plant illustrates the importance of thoroughly 岛核电站核事故，证实了对假设可能assessing possible nuclear safety impacts of a hypothetical, 发生的极端外部事故全面评估的重要yet credible, extreme external event. It also illustrates the 性。它也证实了对类似事故紧急反应importance of emergency response command and control, 指挥与控制，培训，资源有效性是非training, and resource availability for such an event.
常重要的。
A theme common in these events is that, over time, 这些事故的一个共性就是，一段problems crept in, often related to or a direct result of the 时间内问题不知不觉出现。这经常与plant culture. Had these problems been recognized, 电站的核文化有着直接的关系。如果challenged, and resolved, the events could have been 人们认识到这些问题，勇于挑战这些prevented or their severity lessened. The series of decisions 问题，解决这些问题，那么这些事故and actions that resulted in these events can usually be
是可以避免的，或者这些事故的严重traced to the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs of the
性是可以降低的。通常可以从共有的organization.
理念，价值观，以及组织的信条中找
到这些决策及行为的某些踪迹。
These events and the notion that culture is a key ingredient 这些事故、以及文化是核电站全in the overall success of the plant form the basis for this 面成功的关键因素的概念，形成了本document. 文件的基础。 Organizational culture is the shared basic assumptions that are developed in an organization as it learns and copes with problems. The basic assumptions that have worked well enough to be considered valid are taught to new members of 组织文化是一个组织在其学习和解决问题过程中形成的共有理念。这些理念之前运用的很好，因此组织的the organization as the correct way to perceive, think, act, 新成员会继续学习，认为这些信念是and feel. Culture is the sum total of a group’s learning. 理解、思考、以及感受的正确方法。Culture is for the group what character and personality are 文化是一个组织学习的总和。文化对for the individual. 于一个企业而言，就如同性格对于一
个人的意义。
In addition to a healthy organizational culture, each nuclear 由于核电站的特殊性和技术的特station, because of the special characteristics and unique 殊危害性——副产品有辐射、核反应hazards of the technology—radioactive byproducts, 堆能量集中、衰变热，除了有一个健concentration of energy in the reactor core, and decay 全的组织文化，每个核电站还需要有heat—needs a healthy safety culture. 一个健全的安全文化。 Nuclear safety culture is defined as the core values and leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over 核安全文化定义为，领导及个人behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by 为了保护员工和环境，集体做出“安
competing goals to ensure protection of people and the 全高于一切”的核心价值观和行为。 environment.
This updated definition was developed to apply broadly 该定义广泛地适用于所有运用核across all industries that use nuclear technologies. For the 技术的工业。对于商用核电工业，核commercial nuclear power industry, nuclear safety remains 安全具有至高的重要性。尽管放射安the overriding priority. Although the same traits apply to 全，工业安全，环境安全具有相同的radiological safety, industrial safety, security, and 特征，核安全是核电站的第一价值观，environmental safety, nuclear safety is the first value
并且永不废弃。 adopted at a nuclear station and is never abandoned.
Nuclear safety is a collective responsibility. The concept of 核安全是集体的责任。核安全的nuclear safety culture applies to every employee in the 概念适用于所有工作在核电组织的人nuclear organization, from the board of directors to the 员，从董事长到每一位员工。组织中individual contributor. No one in the organization is exempt 的任何人都有责任确保“安全第一”，from the obligation to ensure safety first. 无一例外。 The performance of individuals and organizations can be 个人及组织的表现具有可监测性monitored and trended and, therefore, may serve as an 和可跟踪性，因此可以做为一个组织indicator of the health of an organization’s safety culture. 安全文化的指标。然而，根据安全文However, the health of a facility’s safety culture could lie 化推广程度不同，一个健全的安全文anywhere along a broad continuum, depending on the 化存在于一个广泛的连续范围内。尽degree to which the attributes of safety culture are
管安全文化是一个无形的概念，但确embraced. Even though safety culture is somewhat of an
intangible concept, it is possible to determine whether a 认一个核电站是否持续发展还是可能station tends toward one end of the continuum or the other. 的。 Commercial nuclear power plants are designed, built, and 商用核电站是为了发电而设计、operated to produce electricity. Safety, production, and cost 建造和运行的。安全、生产、成本控control are necessary goals for the operation of such a plant. 制对于此类核电站来说是必要目标。These outcomes are quite complementary, and most plants 而这些目标是互补的，现代的核电站today achieve high levels of safety, impressive production 大多从长远的眼光来做决策和行动，records, and competitive costs, reinforced by decisions and
因此核电站运营较为安全、产出高、actions made with a long-term view. This perspective keeps
safety as the overriding priority for each plant and for each 成本低。这种远见使每一个电站和个
individual associated with it.
Nuclear safety culture is a leadership responsibility. 人将安全放在第一位。 核安全文化是一种领导层的责Experience has shown that leaders in organizations with a 任。经验证实，组织中具有健全的安healthy safety culture foster safety culture through activities 全文化观的领导在生产活动中注重以such as the following: 下方面： Leaders reinforce safety culture at every opportunity.
The health of safety culture is not taken for granted. 领导利用每一次机会强化安全文化。领导不会理所当然地认为安
全文化是健全的。
Leaders frequently measure the health of safety culture
with a focus on trends rather than absolute values. 领导经常是通过关注趋势，而不是根据绝对值来检验安全文化的
健全度。
Leaders communicate what constitutes a healthy safety culture and ensure everyone understands his or her role in its promotion. 领导就构成健全的安全文化与他人交流，确保每一个人理解他/她在促进安全文化中的角色。
领导认识到安全文化并不是全
部，但也不是无足轻重，而是认
识到，它是连续的，不断变化的。
因此，在组织内部和外部（如监
管机构）讨论安全文化是非常必
要的。
The traits described in this document are divided into three 本文所描述的特征分为三个类Leaders recognize that safety culture is not all or nothing but is, rather, constantly moving along a continuum. As a result, there is a comfort in discussing safety culture within the organization as well as with outside groups, such as regulatory agencies. categories that are similar to the three categories of safety 别，与《国际核安全顾问团（INSAG）culture in International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group -4——安全文化》中的分类相似。分(INSAG)-4, Safety Culture. The categories and their 类及其主要特征如下: primary traits are as follows:
Individual Commitment to Safety — Personal Accountability — Questioning Attitude — Safety Communication
Management Commitment to Safety — Leadership Accountability — Decision-Making
— Respectful Work Environment
Management Systems — Continuous Learning
— Problem Identification and Resolution — Environment for Raising Concerns — Work Processes
个人安全承诺 —个人职责 —质疑的态度 —安全沟通 管理者安全承诺 —领导职责 —决策
—彼此尊重的工作环境管理体系 —持续学习
—识别问题、解决问题—关注的氛围 —工作流程
THE TRAITS AND THEIR ATTRIBUTES Individual Commitment to Safety
PA. Personal Accountability
All individuals take personal responsibility for safety.
特征及其特点 个人对安全的承诺
PA. 个人职责
每个人对安全负责。明确理解自
Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well 己的核安全职责和权限。在隶属关系，defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships,
职位权力，团队职责中强调核安全重
positional authority, and team responsibilities emphasize the
于一切。
overriding importance of nuclear safety. Attributes:
特点：
PA.1 Standards: Individuals understand the importance PA.1标准：个人理解遵守核电标of adherence to nuclear standards. All levels of the 准的重要性。对不满足标准的情形，organization exercise accountability for shortfalls in meeting
各级组织应履行相应职责。
standards.
PA.2 Job Ownership: Individuals understand and PA.2 工作主导权：个人理解和践demonstrate personal responsibility for the behaviors and 行自己有利于核安全的行为和工作。 work practices that support nuclear safety.
PA.3 Teamwork: Individuals and work groups PA.3 团队协作：为确保维持核安communicate and coordinate their activities within and 全，个人和团体在组织内外就所从事across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is
的活动进行沟通和协调。
maintained.
QA. Questioning Attitude
QA. 质疑的态度
Individuals avoid complacency and continuously challenge 为了识别可能导致错误或不适当existing conditions, assumptions, anomalies, and activities 操作的差异，个人应避免自满,不断质in order to identify discrepancies that might result in error or
疑现有状况、假设、异常和活动。所
inappropriate action. All employees are watchful for
有员工警惕可能对电厂安全造成不良
assumptions, values, conditions, or activities that can have
影响的理念、价值观、情况或活动。
an undesirable effect on plant safety.
Attributes：
QA.1 Nuclear is Recognized as Special and Unique:
特点：
QA.1认为核技术是特殊的和独特
Individuals understand that complex technologies can fail in 的：个人应认识到，复杂的技术可能unpredictable ways.
在不可预知的情况下失效。
QA.2 Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when
QA.2质疑不明情况：个人面临不
faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and 确定性时应停止操作。工作前应评估managed before work proceeds.
和控制风险。
QA.3 Challenge Assumptions: Individuals challenge
QA.3质疑假设：当人们认为某件
assumptions and offer opposing views when they believe 事不正确时，应质疑假设，并提出相something is not correct.
反观点。
QA.4 Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and
QA.4避免自满：即使认为有成功
plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and 的结果，个人也应意识到错误、潜在inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes.
问题、内在风险可能存在，并做好应
CO. Safety Communication
Communications maintain a focus on safety. Safety communication is broad and includes plant-level communication, job-related communication, worker-level communication, equipment labeling, operating experience, and documentation. Leaders use formal and informal communication to convey the importance of safety. The as the flow of information down the organization. Attributes: CO.1
Work
Process
Communications:
Individuals
对计划。
CO. 安全沟通
沟通时应以安全为中心。有关安全的沟通非常广泛，包括电厂级沟通、工作相关的沟通、工人级沟通、设备标识、操作经验和文档管理。领导利用正式和非正式的沟通传达安全的重
flow of information up the organization is seen as important 要性。组织中上行和下行的信息流同
等重要。 特点：
CO.1工作过程沟通：个人在工作过程中就安全信息进行沟通。
CO.2 决策依据：领导确保运营和
incorporate safety communications in work activities. CO.2 Bases for Decisions: Leaders ensure that the bases for operational and organizational decisions are communicated
in a timely manner.
CO.3 Free Flow of Information: Individuals communicate openly and candidly, both up, down, and across the organization and with oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.
CO.4 Expectations: Leaders frequently communicate and reinforce the expectation that nuclear safety is the organization’s overriding priority.
组织决策的基础及时地得以沟通。
CO.3信息自由流通：个人开放、坦率地在组织中进行上行和下行的沟通。监督、审核和管理机构时也如此。
CO.4预期:领导经常沟通和强化预期：在组织中核安全高于一切。
Management Commitment to Safety
LA. Leadership Accountability
Leaders demonstrate a commitment to safety in their decisions and behaviors. Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety
message
is
communicated
frequently
and
管理者安全承诺
LA.领导职责
领导在决策和行为中体现承诺。总经理和高级经理是核安全文化的倡导者，他们在言行上对核安全起到模范作用。应经常和不间断地对核安全
consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders 信息进行交流，偶尔做为一个独立主throughout the nuclear organization set an example for 题进行交流。领导在整个核电组织中safety. Corporate policies emphasize the overriding 确立一个安全案例，公司法规强调核importance of nuclear safety.
安全重于一切。 特点：
LA.1资源：为支持核安全，领导
Attributes
LA.1 Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel,
equipment, procedures, and other resources are available 确保提供足够和适当的人员、设备、
程序和其他资源。
and adequate to support nuclear safety.
LA.2 Field Presence: Leaders are commonly seen in
LA.2巡视现场：领导经常巡查工
working areas of the plant observing, coaching, and 作场所：观察、指导，强化标准和预
期。对于偏离标准和预期的情况，迅
reinforcing standards and expectations. Deviations from
速纠正。
standards and expectations are corrected promptly.
LA.3 Incentives, Sanctions, and Rewards: Leaders
LA.3激励、惩罚和奖励：领导确
ensure incentives, sanctions, and rewards are aligned with 保激励、惩罚和奖励与核安全方针一
致，并强调，行为和结果体现出安全
nuclear safety policies and reinforce behaviors and
重于一切。
outcomes that reflect safety as the overriding priority.
LA.4 Strategic Commitment to Safety: Leaders ensure
LA.4安全战略承诺：领导确保电
plant priorities are aligned to reflect nuclear safety as the 厂的优先考虑的事与核安全高于一切
的信念相一致。
overriding priority.
LA.5 Change Management: Leaders use a systematic LA.5 变化管理：为确保安全重于process for evaluating and implementing change so that 一切，领导使用一个系统的过程评估
和实施变化。 nuclear safety remains the overriding priority.
LA.6 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities: Leaders LA.6角色、责任和权力：为保证clearly define roles, responsibilities, and authorities to 核安全，领导明确定义角色、责任和
权力。 ensure nuclear safety.
LA.7 Constant Examination: Leaders ensure that nuclear LA.7持续检查：为确保对核安全safety is constantly scrutinized through a variety of 进行持续检查，领导使用多种监测技
术，包括核文化评估。 monitoring techniques, including assessments of nuclear
safety culture.
LA.8 Leader Behaviors: Leaders exhibit behaviors that set the standard for safety.
DM. Decision-Making
Decisions that support or affect nuclear safety are LA.8领导者行为：领导演示为安全确立标准的行为。 DM.决策 决策可以系统、严格、彻底地支systematic, rigorous, and thorough. Operators are vested 持或影响核安全。当面对非预期或不
确定的情况时，为确保电厂臵于安全with the authority and understand the expectation, when
状态，操作者拥有权限，并且了解预faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the
期。高层领导支持和强化做出保守决plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and
策。 reinforce conservative decisions.
Attributes:
DM.1 Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, 特点： DM.1一致的过程：个人使用一个systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are 一致的、系统的方法来作决策。适当incorporated as appropriate.
DM.2 Conservative Bias: Individuals use 地洞察风险。 DM.2保守的偏见：个人在决策时decision-making practices that emphasize prudent choices 谨慎选择那些简单可行的选项。不是
over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is 为了工作进行，而确认一个建议活动determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe 是安全的，也不是为了停工而确认其
不安全。 in order to stop.
DM.3 Accountability for decisions: Single-point accountability is maintained for nuclear safety decisions.
WE. Respectful Work Environment
Trust and respect permeate the organization, creating a WE.彼此尊重的工作环境 组织中应存在信任和尊重，创造一DM.3决策职责：有关核安全决策的单点责任应保持下来。 respectful work environment. A high level of trust is 个彼此尊重的工作环境。通过及时准established in the organization, fostered, in part, through 确地沟通，高度信任可以局部地在一
个组织中建立，培养起来。鼓励和讨timely and accurate communication. Differing professional
论不一致的专业观点并及时解决矛opinions are encouraged, discussed, and resolved in a timely
盾。对于员工的关注应给予回应。 manner. Employees are informed of steps taken in response
to their concerns.
Attributes:
WE.1 Respect is Evident: Everyone is treated with dignity and respect.
WE.2 Opinions are Valued: Individuals are encouraged to voice concerns, provide suggestions, and raise questions. 提出建议和问题。尊重不同观点。 Differing opinions are respected.
WE.3 High Level of Trust: Trust is fostered among individuals and work groups throughout the organization. WE.4 Conflict Resolution: Fair and objective methods are used to resolve conflicts.
工作团队之间培养信任。 WE.4解决冲突：解决冲突时使用公平和客观的方法。 WE.3高度信任：在组织中的个体和 特点： WE.1尊重是明显的：尊重每个人。 WE.2重视意见：鼓励个人说出顾虑，
Management Systems
CL. Continuous Learning CL.持续学习 管理体系 Opportunities to continuously learn are valued, sought 评估、寻求、实现持续学习的机out, and implemented. Operating experience is highly 会。重视操作经验，提高从以往经验valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well 学习的能力。为了激励学习和提高能developed. Training, self-assessments, and benchmarking 力，可以应用培训、自我评估、对照are used to stimulate learning and improve performance. 管理。用不同的监测技术对核安全进Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a
行持续的、详细的审查，其中的一些variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an
技术可以提供独立的新视角。 independent “fresh look.”
Attributes:
CL.1 Operating Experience: The organization systematically 特点： CL.1操作经验：组织适时、系统、and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements lessons 有效地收集、评估和应用内部和外部from relevant internal and external operating experience 的操作经验信息。 information in a timely manner.
CL.2 Self-Assessment: The organization routinely conducts CL.2自我评估：组织例行地对程self-critical and objective assessments of its programs, 序、实践和表现进行自我批评和客观practices, and performance. 评价。 CL.3 Benchmarking: The organization learns from other CL.3对照：为不断提高知识、技organizations to continuously improve knowledge, skills, 能及安全表现，组织向其它组织学习。 and safety performance.
CL.4 Training: High-quality training maintains a CL.4培训：高质量的培训可以维knowledgeable workforce and reinforces high standards for 持一个学识渊博的员工团队，利于保maintaining nuclear safety. 持核安全的高标准。 PI. Problem Identification and Resolution PI.识别问题、解决问题 Issues potentially impacting safety are promptly 迅速识别、彻底评估影响安全的identified, fully evaluated, and promptly addressed and 潜在问题，根据重要性迅速处理和纠corrected commensurate with their significance.
Identification and resolution of a broad spectrum of 正。为加强安全和提高表现，应识别problems, including organizational issues, are used to 和解决包括组织问题在内的广泛问strengthen safety and improve performance. 题。 Attributes:
PI.1 Identification: The organization implements a 特点： PI.1识别:为识别问题，组织可执corrective action program with a low threshold for 行一个低门槛的纠正措施计划。个人identifying issues. Individuals identify issues completely, 按照程序及时、彻底、准确地识别问accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with the 题。 program.
PI.2 Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates PI.2评估：为确保问题的解决措issues to ensure that problem resolutions and solutions 施、原因阐述和范围状况与其安全重address causes and extents of conditions commensurate with 要性一致，组织应彻底评估问题。 their safety significance.
PI.3 Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective PI.3解决问题：为解决问题，组actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate 织及时采取与问题安全重要性相一致with their safety significance. 的纠正措施。 PI.4 Trending: The organization periodically analyzes PI.4趋势：组织定期分析纠正措information from the corrective action program and other 施计划和其它评估结果，以此识别不assessments in the aggregate to identify adverse trends or 利趋势和状况。 conditions.
RC. Environment for Raising Concerns
A safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) is RC.提出顾虑的氛围 建立一个有安全意识的环境maintained where personnel feel free to raise safety （SCWE），个人可以自由地提出顾虑，concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, 而不用担心遭到报复、威胁、侵扰或harassment, or discrimination. The station creates, maintains, and evaluates policies and processes that allow personnel to freely raise concerns.
Attributes: 歧视。电厂建立、维护、评估相关政策和程序，允许员工提出顾虑。 特点：
RC.1 SCWE Policy: The organization implements a policy RC.1SCWE原则：组织鼓励个人提that supports individual rights and responsibilities to raise 出安全顾虑，并不会受到报复、威胁、safety concerns and does not tolerate harassment, 侵扰或歧视。 intimidation, retaliation, or discrimination for doing so.
RC.2 Alternate Process for Raising Concerns: The RC.2提出关注的其他程序：组织organization implements a process for raising and resolving 执行一套不受管理影响的鼓励提出顾concerns that is independent of line management influence. 虑的程序。员工可以自信地提出安全Safety issues may be raised in confidence and are resolved 问题，并被及时有效地解决问题。 in a timely and effective manner.
WP. Work Processes WP.工作程序 The process of planning and controlling work activities 为保证安全，执行计划和控制工is implemented so that safety is maintained. Work 作。工作管理是一个特定程序。该程management is a deliberate process in which work is 序对工作进行识别、选择、计划、进identified, selected, planned, scheduled, executed, closed, 度、执行、完成和评审。整个组织参and critiqued. The entire organization is involved in and 与并支持该程序。 fully supports the process.
Attributes:
WP.1 Work Management: The organization implements 特点： WP.1工作管理：组织执行一套计a process of planning, controlling, and executing work 划、控制和执行工作活动的程序，以activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. 确保核安全重于一切。工作程序包括The work process includes the identification and 识别和管理与工作相关的风险。 management of risk commensurate to the work.
WP.2 Design Margins: The organization operates and WP.2设计裕量：组织在设计裕量maintains equipment within design margins. Margins are 内操作并维护设备。只有通过谨慎、carefully guarded and changed only through a systematic 系统的程序才可以监视和改变裕量。and rigorous process. Special attention is placed on 对保持裂变产品屏障、纵深防御和安maintaining fission product barriers, defense-in-depth, and 全相关设备要保持特别注意。 safety-related equipment.
WP.3 Documentation: The organization creates and maintains complete, accurate, and up-to-date WP.3文件：组织建立和保持完整、
documentation.
WP.4 Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions.
准确和最新的文件。
WP.4遵守程序：个人遵守工艺流程、程序和工作指导书。
20
Acknowledgements
致谢
The following individuals participated in advisory groups that developed the traits and attributes in this document.
以下个人参与了顾问团并对本文档作出了贡献。
Jeffrey B. Archie
Senior Vice President and David F. Garchow
Vice President, Plant Technical Bernard Jeannin
Safety Standards Advisor Kevin J. Mulligan
Vice President, Operations Chief Nuclear Officer
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company
Ronald A. Barnes
Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
Arizona Public Service Company
Elizabeth Beswick Nuclear Professionalism
Consultant Nuclear Generation EDF Energy Susan Brissette
Manager, Management System Department Bruce Power Annick Carnino Director
Energy Strategists Consultancy Limited
Conrad Dube Project Manager WANO Paris Center Randall K. Edington
Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Arizona Public Service Company
Edwin J. Eilola
Director, Nuclear Oversight PSEG Nuclear LLC
Jose Manuel Diaz Francisco Communication and Safety Coordinator Electronuclear
Preston D. Swafford
Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Tennessee Valley Authority Carin Sylvander
Human Performance, RQH and Safety Culture
Vattenfall AB; Ringhals NPP Alexandra Tudor Engineer, Performance Monitoring Section Safety and Compliance Department
CNE Cernavoda, S.N. Nuclearelectrica Eduard Volkov Director
Prognoz - Obninsk Science Research Center Andrew J. Vomastek Fleet Manager, Dominion Nuclear Employee Concerns Programs
Dominion Generation
Support
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Ronald Gaston Licensing Manager Exelon Corporation Billie Garde, Esq. Partner
Clifford & Garde, LLP Pierre Francois Gest Senior Safety Officer
Operational Safety Section International Atomic Energy Agency
Edward D. Halpin
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company Jun Hamada
General Manager & Group Leader
Japan Nuclear Technology Institute Lori Hayes
Manager, Corporate Nuclear Oversight
Progress Energy, Inc. Albert R. Hochevar
Deputy Director, OR Team Leaders
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Tom Houghton
Senior Director, Safety Focused Regulation Nuclear Energy Institute William R. Illing
Senior Program Manager Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Safety and Security Coordination
International Atomic Energy Agency Molly Keefe
Human Factors Analyst Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Anne Kerhoas
Senior Safety Specialist
Division of Nuclear Installation Safety
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security
International Atomic Energy Agency
G. Kenneth Koves, Ph.D. Principal Program Manager Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Johann Kritzinger
Corporate Consultant: Human Performance
Nuclear Operating Unit Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd Valérie Lagrange
Safety Management & Human Factors Advisor
Nuclear Operation Division Electricité de France James E. Lynch
Vice President, Assistance Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
Kamishan Martin
Human Factors Engineer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Stephanie Morrow, Ph.D. Human Factors Analyst Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
21
Support
Entergy Nuclear Michael J. Pacilio
President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear Exelon Corporation Ray Powell
Chief, Technical Support and Assessment Branch Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Gregory Rolina Researcher
Mines ParisTech Philip K. Russell Team Leader
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Jack Rutkowski Reactor Inspector Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eric Ruesch
Senior Reactor Inspector Region IV
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Diane Sieracki
Senior Safety Culture Program Manager
Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Undine Shoop
Chief, Health Physics and Human Performance Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission