本科毕业论文
外文文献及译文
文献、资料题目： Study on the Supervision System with
V oluntary Information Disclosure
文献、资料来源：Journal of Accounting&Economics
文献、资料发表（出版）日期：2008年9月
院 （部）： 商学院
专 业： 会计学辅修专业
班 级： 会计辅修专业09级
姓 名：
学 号：
指导教师：
翻译日期： 2017年9月17日
A Study on the Supervision System with Voluntary Information Disclosure
in Chinese Listed Companies
Abstract
The voluntary information of listed companies is based on corporate image, the investor relates, which is to avoid lawsuit risk besides the compulsory information disclosure. The information, which the companies disclosed on their own initiative, is the important part of disclosure information. It is an effective way that demonstrates their core competitive ability. The author analyzed the problems on voluntary information disclosed, which existed in Chinese mainland listed company, proposed the suggestion of constructing supervision system which listed companies voluntary information to disclose.
Keywords: Listed companies, Compulsory information disclosure, Voluntary
information disclosure, Supervision
System
1.As the expansion of the increase of the number of listed companies and the increasingly drastic market competition,the competition has become more difficult in more and more listed companies. In order to catch the scarce resource--the capital, companies tend to choose the way of Voluntary information Disclosure. Listed companies,with voluntary to disclose the information refers to corporate image, the investor relation, avoid lawsuit risk besides the compulsory information disclosure. However, the supervision system is not good enough; the information disclosed voluntarily is hard to be proof the truth. Therefore, it becomes more and more important to build the supervision system with voluntary information disclosure for listed companies.
2. Motivation of Compulsory information disclosure
Information, the Voluntary disclosure, is the executives in listed companies on personnel benefit to disclose on own initiative. According to the economic theory of "the economic man rationality", the superintendents balance the behavior and do not take, completely based on the benefit and this behavior which is the costing. The superintende nt’s decision-making is also based on the cost benefit analysis, if the voluntary information disclosure brings the benefit is larger than the cost, then the superintendent can carry on voluntarily disclosed, otherwise, the
superintendent rather does not carry on the voluntary information to disclose, their manners will change with the cost income relations changing. (Kai Xiang, 2004)
With the China capital market gradually development, the business management authority can reduce the average capital cost, enhance the financial analyst and investor's interest, enhance company confidence level, improve investment relations, stand out company competitive advantages, enhance company stocks market fluidity, but also may reduce the company’s lawsuit risk ,bec ause the disclosure is not enough and so on, by disclosing voluntary information besides the compulsory information disclosure. The China capital market information disclosure also can gradually move to the stage of paying equal attention to voluntary and compulsory disclosure, not the simply regarding of the compulsory disclosure, the voluntary information disclosure will certainly to be the effective way,by which listed companies can demonstrate the core competitive ability, communicate with the stakeholders, and describe the company future. (Xianzhong Song, 2006)
3. Content of Compulsory information disclosure
Listed companies, with voluntary to disclose the information is refers to corporate image, the investor relates, avoid lawsuit risk except for the compulsory information disclosure. Learning from foreign listed companies’ experience of disclosing information voluntarily , and according to the situation in China, the listed companies voluntary disclosure of information include:
The forward-looking information, based on the company's “core competence”. It contains the operation,the business plan, strategic planning, business environment and so on. All of information can help investors to make rational investment judgments and decision-making; Information communicated with the market intermediaries and investors or the evaluation information from them;
Information of human resources. Under the conditions of the knowledge economy society, human capitalbecomes more and more important. Particularly in the high tech, high-growth companies, employees are the company's most valuable asset. Research shows that these companies were significantly better than other companies,in the above-mentioned aspects of the voluntary disclosure of information;
According to the accounting standards of the conservative principles, there is also lack of
proper disclosure rules or low in requirements disclosure, which is useful for the investment
decision-making, such as fair value;
Corporate governance, environmental protection and social responsibility do not have mandatory disclosure information, because of complexity from the measurement and disclosure (Derong Zhang, 2004).
4. Main problems exist in Compulsory information disclosure
4.1 Low Voluntary Disclosure Rate and low initiative
A number of listed companies regard voluntary disclosure of information as an additional burden, rather than a kind of obligation or the right, which should be given to the shareholders. Thus they will be passive to disclose the information, that’s to say, they will take less disclosure as less as possible. With time going by, the concept of this understanding is accepted by people, so that the deviation in the information disclosure makes listed companies in a passive response. The main reason is that the listed company is too worry to tell the public the secret in its management, and thus the disclosure of information creates a psychological fear and evasive to them.
4.2 Lack of integrity of Voluntary information disclosure
Today, Chinese listed companies’ practice of disclosing information voluntarily is not satisfactory. Many listed companies are reluctant to disclose, and some listed companies only disclose the company's financial information;but the "bad news" or involved matters with a certain risk, or other seriously matters, the companies are kept silent.
Moreover, many listed companies do not disclose fully credibility, hoping the investors rely on the “popular”, then to help them succeed .Chinese investors are not maturity, particularly in the processing, handling and analyzing information. Therefore, it is very difficult to judge the value of the company through the signal transferred by the company.
4.3 The voluntary disclosure of false information
Generally speaking, the voluntary information disclosure has high credibility. To the non-mandatory requirements information, managers often disclose the less likely to lead to the disclosure of risk information for reducing the risk of litigation and avoiding legal sanctions. In addition, the main motive of high-quality enterprises disclosing the information to the investors is to convey the signal quality of enterprises, so as to reduce monitoring costs. V oluntary information disclosure generally has higher quality. However, the absence of mandatory disclosure is as strict guidelines as regulate, and authorities have the tendency of
opportunism, prone to the problem of moral hazard.
What’s more, the poor quality of the enterprises are based o n the theory of signal transduction, transmission of false information, the voluntary disclosure of information is not the same to the mandatory information , as to undergo a rigorous audit. And voluntary disclosure of information is difficult to guarantee the quality.
4.4 Content of voluntary information disclosure is not standard
At present, mainly Chinese listed companies are the compulsory disclosure of information, and voluntary disclosure of information in some documents are scattered, in reality, Chinese listed companies ,disclosing voluntarily information, can not meet regulators, securities analysts and investors demand regardless of content or quality.
Chinese listed companies in the voluntary disclosure of information content norms. The China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "public offerings stock, the disclosure of corporate information content and format standards" of the relevant provisions of 1-6 in the annotated "Open-here," although voluntary disclosure of information to the left of the room, but the lack of specific guidelines and the corresponding policy support, the overall level of the listed companies to disclose information voluntarily is low. Therefore, Chinese voluntary disclosure of information is worthy of paying attention and needs to be solved.
5. Improve Supervision System of Voluntary information Disclosure in listed companies
As growing competition of capital in the market and the gradually standardization of legal system, there will be a growing trend of voluntary information disclosure for adapt with the complex and ever-changing and highly uncertain economic environment. For the problems existing in Chinese listed companies voluntary information disclosure, and learning from the practical experience on foreign listed companies, the author makes the following recommendations:
5.1 Actively encourage and protect listed companies voluntarily disclose information
With the gradually maturation of Chinese capital market, on the basis of the management company completing the mandatory disclosure of information provided voluntary disclosure of information. Therefore, the regulatorydepartments should encourage listed companies to voluntary disclosure of information, add clauses in the policies and regulations, encourage listed companies to disclose the voluntary information besides existing laws, regulations and rules, meet the investors’ growing demands. At the same time, in order to avoid some of the
company's management should not be faced litigation risk and other problems, regulators need to study and formulate relevant policies for the company's voluntary disclosure of information act to protect them. "Deliberate manipulation" and
"accidental factors" belong to different nature of the situations and treat them differently. It should investigate the law liability to parties in the first case. Otherwise, only the listed companies have adequate evidences and can explain reasonably, don’t look into their liability.
5.2 Strengthen supervising and managing prevent to disclose the false information at will and protect the market order
Once the voluntary disclosure information published, it must accept the essential surveillance and the restraint equally with the compulsory disclosure information. But voluntary information disclosure is still lack essential surveillance rules currently, should establish a set of voluntary information disclosure supervising and managing system, standard voluntary information quality. For example: to establish voluntary information assurance and compensation system, to perform the heavy fine to the enterprise which misleads the investor and so on. The negotiable securities supervising and managing department and the Exchanges should strengthen supervising and managing to voluntary information disclosure market, prevent to disclose the false information at will, protects the market order. The voluntary information disclosure supervising and managing should contain following several aspects: First, integrity, listed companies voluntarily disclose of the information are both "positive" information, also includes the "negative" information;
Second, systemic, whether listed companies from different angles, through various information disclosure to reveal the same, whether formed a distinctive pattern of voluntary disclosure of information;
Third, dynamic, long-term voluntary listed companies to disclose certain information, and constantly adjusted to improve the reliability of information;
Fourth, widespread, as long as all investors equal access to all listed companies to voluntarily disclose information;
Fifth, the comparative, whether the compulsory information disclosure is mandatory or not, it can be the standards of judgment for the quality of reference standards.
5.3 Giving full attention to the role of market intermediaries to establish the authority of the disclosure of company information quality evaluation system
Listed companies should strengthen communication with institutional investors, brokers, securities analysts and other market intermediaries. Understanding the company's external information needs to reduce the company's asymmetric information through voluntary disclosure of information. Giving full attention to the role of market ntermediaries, establish the listed company disclosure information quality evaluation system by market intermediaries. Acts according to the specialized knowledge and after the company interior information full understanding and the analysis by the market facilitating agency which it has makes the omni-directional appraisal opinion, regularly promotes voluntary information disclosure quality rating results, provides certain authority to information disclosure quality appraisal opinion for the investor, shows the risk by the police which the ordinary investor possibly can face. (HongYin, 2004).
5.4 Strengthen CPA audit to voluntary disclosure of information
CPA audit is an independent, objective and impartial system, it can ensure the credibility of the accounting information. V oluntary Information is provided by the authorities. With speculative risks, the authenticity and reliability of voluntary information should be tested by certified public accountant. Although the audit of voluntary information is not as strict as the mandatory information, it should also have forensic capabilities by registered accountants carrying out the necessary scrutiny, to improve and guarantee the credibility of its information. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate and improve audit rules on voluntary disclosure of information, and to increase violation of professional ethics or legal responsibility for the responsibility of a certified public accountant.
5.5 Introduction of voluntary disclosure of information regulatory documents
On a global scale, the voluntary disclosure of information is an irresistible trend of development. With the increasing speed of the change of the economic environment, the requirement for the accounting information relevant are higher and higher, by the extraneous user, the existing compulsory disclosure information will be inevitably difficult to satisfy their information need. Therefore, the extraneous information user on the existence to the businessmanagement authority disclosed voluntarily some information help policy-making the demand. We believed that,every the one which does not fall in the scope of the compulsory information disclosure content stipulation, and be helpful to the benefit counterparts to the policy-making information, all may be defined as the voluntary information disclosure.
United States Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2001 on the voluntary disclosure of the contents of information provides as follows: "operational data, the analysis of the data management, and forward-looking information, relating to the management and shareholders of the information, not be confirmed in statements of intangible assets". Therefore, China should and must make a comprehensive and in-depth investigation for stakeholder information needs, and model the frame which the Stering committee proposed in FASB, namely confirmed some information is whether useful, by this to decide to provide the information or not, and standardize the content of the information disclosure. When the accounting standard setters sector and the securities regulatory departments are in the formulation of policies and programs should take into account that how to guide enterprises to carry out some of the disclosure of private information, and the securities regulatory departments should be introduced listed companies to disclose information voluntarily charter guidelines as soon as possible, to encourage and regulate listed companies voluntarily information disclosure.
References
[1]Kai Xiang. (2004). Listed companies to disclose information voluntarily Cause of Economic Analysis of the. Accounting Communications, (5).
[2]Xianzhong Song. (2006). Enterprise core competencies of the voluntary disclosure of information. Accounting Research, (2)
[3]Derong Zhang. (2004). Enterprise voluntary disclosure of information. Accounting Digest , (1)
[4]HongYin. (2004). Optimization of China's listed companies Opinion on voluntary disclosure of information.Accounting Digest, (6)
中文译文
一个自愿性信息披露与我国上市公司监管问题的研究体系
摘 要: 上市公司自愿性信息是企业形象的基础上，投资者有关，这是为了避免诉讼，除强制信息披露的风险。资料显示，该公司主动披露，是披露信息的重要组成部分。它是一种有效的方式，表明自己的核心竞争能力。笔者分析了自愿披露的信息，这在中国大陆上市公司存在，提出了建设监理制度，上市公司自愿性信息披露的建议的问题。
关键词：上市公司；强制信息披露；自愿性信息披露；监督
1引言
作为上市公司的数量增加和日益激烈的市场竞争的扩大，市场竞争变得更为困难，越来越多的上市公司。为了赶上稀缺的资源 - 资本，企业倾向于选择自愿性信息披露方式。与上市公司自愿披露的信息，是指企业形象，投资者关系，避免诉讼，除强制信息披露的风险。然而，监管制度不够好，信息披露自愿很难被证明的真理。因此，它变得越来越重要，建立与上市公司自愿性信息披露监管制度。
2. 强制信息披露的动机
信息，自愿披露，在对上市公司高管人员受益主动披露。据“经济人理性”的经济理论，警司平衡的行为，不采取完全的利益和行为，这是成本计算的基础。院长的决策也是基于成本效益分析，如果自愿性信息披露带来的好处是低于成本较大，则院长可进行自愿披露，否则，院长相当不进行志愿信息透露，他们的态度会改变的收入与成本的关系发生变化。
随着中国资本市场的逐步发展，企业管理当局可以降低平均资本成本，提高金融分析师和投资者的利益，提高公司的信心水平，改善投资关系，突出企业的竞争优势，提高公司股票的市场流动性，但也可能会降低公司的诉讼风险，因为披露是不够的，等等，除了强制披露信息披露义务的信息。中国资本市场的信息披露也可以逐步向并重自愿和强制披露的阶段，而不是单纯的强制披露有关的自愿性信息披露的必将是有效的方式，其中上市公司可以证明核心竞争能力，与有关各方沟通，并说明该公司的未来。
3。强制信息披露的内容
与上市公司自愿披露的信息是指企业形象，关乎投资者，避免除强制信息披露的诉讼风险。学习国外上市公司自愿披露信息的经验，并根据情况在中国，上市公司自愿披露的
信息包括：
这些前瞻性信息的基础上，公司的“核心能力”。它包含的运作，业务计划，战略规划，商业环境等。所有的信息可以帮助投资者作出理性的投资判断和决策;
信息沟通与市场中介机构和投资者或得到他们的评价资料;
人力资源信息。根据知识经济社会条件下，人类capitalbecomes 越来越重要。特别是在高科技，高成长型企业，员工是公司最宝贵的资产。研究表明，这些公司均显着高于其他企业更好地在自愿披露的信息上述问题;
据保守原则的会计标准，也有在适当的披露规则的要求或低缺乏披露，这对投资决策，如公允价值的，有用的;
公司治理，环境保护和社会责任，因为没有强制披露信息的复杂性，从计量和披露
4. 义务教育阶段存在的主要问题存在信息披露
4.1低利率和低自愿性信息披露的倡议
一个上市公司数量视为额外负担自愿披露的信息，而不是义务或权利，应赋予股东实物。因此，他们将被动披露的信息，这就是说，他们将采取以下披露尽可能少。光阴荏苒，这一概念的理解是被人们所接受，因此在信息披露的偏差，使上市公司处于被动的反应。最主要的原因是，上市公司过于担心，告诉公众在其管理的秘诀，从而对信息披露造成的心理恐惧和回避他们。
4.2缺乏对自愿性信息披露的完整性
今天，中国上市公司自愿披露信息的做法并不令人满意。许多上市公司都不愿透露，一些上市公司只披露该公司的财务信息，但具有一定的风险，或者其他严重问题的“坏消息”或涉及的事项，这些公司保持沉默。
此外，许多上市公司没有充分披露的可信性，希望投资者对“流行”，然后帮助他们取得成功的依据。中国投资者并不成熟，特别是在加工，处理和分析资料。因此，它是非常难以判断通过该公司转移的信号，公司的价值。
4.3自愿披露虚假信息
一般而言，自愿性信息披露具有较高的可信度。对于非强制性要求的信息，管理者往往不披露可能导致减少诉讼风险，避免法律制裁的风险信息披露。此外，高品质的信息披露对投资者企业的主要动机是传达企业的信号质量，以减少监测费用。自愿性信息披露一般具有较高的质量。然而，强制性披露的情况下一样规范严格的准则，以及当局的机会主义倾向，容易出现道德风险问题。
更重要的是，企业的质量差的信号转导，虚假信息传输理论的基础上，自愿披露的信